Abstract
Most of the writings dedicated to assessing the contribution of the Spanish Second Scholasticism to the controversial issue of infidels' dominion began their analyses with the well-known Francisco de Vitoria's Relectiones (1532) . This article offers a reconstruction of the history of the theological and juridical debates on this key issue on the Iberian Peninsula since the late 13 th century. Special attention is paid to friar Matías de Paz, who was asked to offer his advice on the early patterns of rule and domination imposed on the Native Americans at the Junta de Burgos (1512), introduced to the discussions about asuntos de Indias the Thomist conceptual framework later employed by Vitoria, Soto, Suárez and many other prominent members of the so-called School of Salamanca. The article shows that it was, in fact, De Paz who first considered the Amerindians infidels affected by an »invincible ignorance«, and he tried to curb some of the many abuses committed against them by applying the distinctions between different types of dominium and principatus.
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Introduction. Early Salamancian approaches to infidelity, the right to dominion and just war (15 th century)
Even if most of the studies dedicated to the School of Salamanca's contribution to the theory of just war in the early modern period begin with an analysis of Francisco de Vitoria's famous Relectiones, the reflections focusing on infidelity, the right to dominion and just war at the University of Salamanca, and by teachers and pupils of the prestigious Castilian University, belong to a long tradition going back at least to the mid-15 th century, a crucial period for the Iberian expansion in Africa.
In previous writings, 1 I focused on the support given to the expansionist politics of the Castilian monarchy by jurist Alfonso de Cartagena and theologian Bernardino López de Carvajal. With his Allegationes super conquesta insularum Canarie contra Portugalenses (1435), 2 Alfonso de Cartagena supported the rights of Juan II of Castille to the dominion over the Canarian archipelago, minimising the titles alleged by other Christian-European princes -especially the one alleged by the Portuguese. On his own, as early as April 1493, Bernardino López de Carvajal was the first orator to refer to the discoveries of Columbus »on the road to the Indies« and to ask for the dominion of the territories discovered in the Western Atlantic on behalf of the Reyes Católicos before Pope Alexander VI and the College of Cardinals.
3
Contrary to what would be the distinctive and influential approach of Francisco de Vitoria, both of them completely overlooked any hypothetical claim of the indigenous pagan populations of the Canary and Antillean islands to the dominion over the territories they inhabited for centuries. As we stated in the above-mentioned publications, while Alfonso de Cartagena declared the Canary Islands »vacuae per respectum ad superioritatem« 4 before the arrival of Castilian expeditioners, López de Carvajal -carried away by the joy of the recent victory over the Muslims of Granada (in January 1492) -simply ignored any rights to dominion of the peoples ›discovered‹ by Columbus, taking for granted that the overseas territories reached by Columbus were now part of the large Castilian crown.
The juridical and political vocabulary found in the writings of Cartagena, López de Carvajal and other Salamanca jurists and theologians -just like the one employed by contemporary Portuguese 5 and Italian 6 learned men writing about dominion 1 Egío / Birr (2018a) ; Egío / Birr (2018b (1915, 1997) , and the many chronicles written by his follower Rui de Pina, who at the beginning of the 16 th century wrote accounts of the life and accomplishments of the Portuguese kings from the late 12 th century (reign of Sancho I) to the late 15 th century (reign of Joao II). The chronicle dedicated to the reign of Duarte I is especially important with regards to the juridical debates about the dominion over the Canary Is-and infidelity in this period -inherited without significant changes the conceptual framework constructed by Pope Innocent IV 7 and Enrico di Susausually called [H] ostiensis 8 -in the 13 th century.
9
Even if the Iberian ›discoveries‹ in Africa and Asia represent for most historians the turning point between the Middle Ages and the early modern era, the first theological and juridical discussions about the status of those ›infidel‹ peoples newly ›discovered‹ by Christian expeditionaries appear to be, in fact, a clear and direct continuation of the Late Middle Ages approach to the relationship between dominion and faith.
Hispanic Thomism before Vitoria (13 th -15 th centuries)
Within this general and ancient framework,
10
the emergence of a new theoretical and conceptual approach has to be seen as one of the many indirect and unexpected results derived from the introduction of the Summa theologiae as the handbook for the students of theology in Christian Western universities, a process of substitution of the Sententiarum libri quatuor, which, initiated at the University of Paris around 1509, 11 took place gradually at the University of Salamanca.
As many scholars have noticed, the teaching of Francisco de Vitoria -since 1526, holder of the chair of Prima de teología at the Faculty of Theology -represented a significant contribution to the introduction of the Thomist theological perspective at Salamanca, influencing the adoption of the Summa theologiae as the official manual for the students of theology in the Estatutos of 1561.
12
Nevertheless, contrary to the usual perspective among the scholars who have dealt with Vitoria's writings and legacy, it is important to take into account that he was not the first great Iberian master who appreciated and applied Aquinas' thought to different issues.
13 On the contrary, lands, Pina (1914 (García Villoslada [1938] 288) are found in his book, his perspective and biased information have been uncritically adopted by many later scholars.
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Vitoria's undoubtedly original and systematic approach to Aquinas' writings has to be understood as the culmination of a long Iberian tradition of dialogue with and around Aquinas' authoritative positions. It was above all in the discussions concerning infidelity and the attitude(s) that Christians should adopt vis-à-vis different kinds of infidels that Aquinas' voice strongly resonated throughout the former religiously split Iberian Peninsula.
As we will see in the last part of this article, 
45
Another important episode in his life, usually overlooked in the approaches to De Paz's biography, is the active role he played shortly after the Junta of Burgos in another crucial implication of the debates about infidelity in contemporary Castile: the attempts to ostracise converted Jews and descendants of converted Jews; expelling them from all ecclesiastical offices and impeding their access to the religious habits and Holy Orders.
46
Resolutely facing the anti-converso campaign initiated by his fellow Dominican (former General Inquisitor and Archbishop of Seville) Diego de Deza -who, shortly after giving support to the partisans of an anti-converso reform of the estatutes concerning the admission of novitiates in the Order of St. Jerome in 1514, tried to extend the scope of this reform to the Dominican monasteries -De Paz tried to obtain the support of important and learned churchmen of his time. His intervention was respectful not only of the theological and canonical framework with which the Church had historically supported the conversion of Jews and their integration in the Christian society, but also of the tradition of convivencia maintained by old Christians and conversos in the colleges and monasteries of Valladolid and Salamanca.
Bishop Alonso de Burgos, who founded the College of San Gregorio (Valladolid) in 1487, where De Paz later studied and taught, was himself a descendant of conversos and stated in a very explicit and vehement way in the first Estatutos of the College -written and approved in the last decade of the 15 th century -that no candidate to the admission in San Gregorio would be discriminated according to the religious adscription of his ancestors.
47 Meaningfully, the second statute mentioned Matías de Paz and his brother Diego as students of the College, and in Statute 59 they are granted the privilege to remain in the Collegetogether with Rector fray Andrés -their whole life.
48
Within this conflict, we can see a first link between the Thomist approach to infidelity and contemporary political and juridical debates: As a printed edition of the Opuscula of Cajetan (1562) 43 There is much more literature about the Laws of Burgos (1512-1513) 50 On the one hand, from a very Thomist theological perspective, 51 he considered this kind of estatutos de limpieza de sangre »unreasonable« (irrationabile) inasmuch as they seem to be an obstacle to the conversion of the Jews to the Christian religion.
52 On the other hand, pragmatically counterbalancing Deza's reasoning and the partisans of ›blood cleansing‹, Cajetan first stated that some customs and circumstances -such as the general hatred of the »Jewish nation« and the hypothetical tendency of many Jews of this time to false conversions and apostasy -could temporally justify their exclusion from the novitiate and religious profession.
53 To the Thomist theological arguments encouraging a cordial welcome of converts in the religious orders and secular Church, Cajetan opposed not only the weight of circumstances and customs but also -secondly -the canonical framework excluding other kinds of men »sine eorum culpa«, that is to say, the illegitimate sons which at this period could not enter religious orders ex defectu natalium. Apart from equating the conditions of conversos and bastards, Cajetan confusingly appealed to other legal prescriptions permitting a free and without fault rejection of certain people from the profession during the first year of novitiate.
54 According to his interpretation, these canons granted the administrators of colleges and monasteries a similar right to prevent unwelcome novices from entering the profession and to even impede attaining the status of novitiate. The prelates were not obliged to give any kind of explanation for this kind of refusal, and even if the rejection was due to the extended hatred or suspicion against conversos, they did not commit any kind of peccatum mortale. The third line of argumentation 56 that, according to Cajetan, could be legitimately invoked by the ecclesiastical authorities in order to justify these kinds of ›undesirable‹ and ›irrational‹ exclusions depended indirectly on the authority of Thomas Aquinas, who is, in fact, the only authority named in the Responsio. Even if including Aquinas seems a little bit artificial, the fact that he is mentioned in the text is very important because he represents a theological authority to which all parties (Deza, on the side of the partisans of limpieza de sangre; De Paz, on the side of the converts and their many supporters) wish to lay claim and acknowledge as carrying more weight. Cajetan, who after printing the Commentaries to the Summa had achieved the highest level of reputation that a learned theologian of his time could enjoy, acted as the oracle tasked with giving voice to the ancient magister and common reference in this dispute. Cajetan referred in particular to Aquinas' Quaestiones quodlibetales and to Secunda secundae in order to deny that the admission of any individual or kind of individuals -in this case, the converts -in a mendicant order could be considered as an obligation of justice or as a precept of charity. writings by De Paz, and considering that they were not printed during his lifetime or afterwardssomething probably linked to its early death 63 -it is highly probable that Quétif and Échard did not mention the works that De Paz actually wrote but instead the works that a holder of a university chair in Theology at this time should or could have written.
The lecture De dominio Regum Hispaniae super Indos makes clear that its author was very familiar with the text of the Summa theologiae and with the biblical excerpts related to topics such as the nature and limits of secular and ecclesiastical authorities, infidels' and Christians' rights to dominion, etc. Thus, it would be no a surprise to find manuscript commentaries to the Summa, or to some biblical books written by De Paz or by some of his disciples, similar to the ones written by Vitoria and later authors from the School of Salamanca. If this is the case, we would be able to explain some obscure passages in De Paz's treatise on the asuntos de Indias and to make the same kind of combined approach to his conceptual apparatus that has been applied to Vitoria.
64
De dominio Regum Hispaniae super Indos, first Thomist defense of infidels' dominion
The important contribution made by the Salamanca's jurists and theologians to the popularisation of Ostiensism in the 15 th century -to which I refer in the first section of the article -is another confirmation of the relatively late reappraisal of Aquinas' Summa at the University of Salamanca, which I dealt with in the second section of the text. At the service of the Castilian monarchy and benefiting from bishoprics, diocesan incomes and other royal offices (as ambassadors, orators and royal preachers), former Salamancian students and teachers such as Cartagena and López de Carvajal -to mention only a few representative individuals who authored relatively original approaches -write functional, circumstantial and repetitive technical reports following the dictates of their masters.
Following, for example, the sermons that other ambassadors of the Castilian kings held before the pope and the College of Cardinals in the second half of the 15 th century, we can observe the strong continuity of a theological and juridical discourse that never abandon the conceptual framework constructed by Innocent IV and Hostiensis and reiterates again and again the arguments of the Italian canonist and cardinal denying any kind of dominion to infidels. In 1462, Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, who also studied at the University of Salamanca and was Alfonso de Cartagena's disciple, celebrated the birth of the long-awaited offspring of Enrique IV and the conquest of Gibraltar in several rousing expansionist sermons given in the presence of Pope Pious II.
65 Later ambassadors of the Catholic kings in the Roman Curia such as Pere Boscà 66 and Alessandro Geraldini 67 followed a similar jubilant and belligerent Ostiensism in the 1480s. The Vatican Apostolic Library holds rare copies of these and other sermons and speeches whose interest for the history of the thought on dominion and infidelity has not been sufficiently taken into account.
Hostiensism was so popular before the critical Junta de Burgos (1512) that in 1510, King Fernando -acting as King of Aragon -instructed his ambassador in Rome, Jerónimo de Vich, to obtain a pontifical bull allowing him to make war and conquer any territory dominated by infidels: »[…] porque dicen que de derecho no es permitido a los príncipes cristianos facer guerra en todas las tierras de todos los infieles, salvo en el reino de Jerusalem, sino en caso que los dichos infieles fagan la guerra a los cristianos, o que la guerra sea declarada contra ellos por el Sumo Pontífice (…) querríamos que, desde luego, 
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José Luis Egío García procurasedes de ganar de nuestro muy Santo Padre una bula en que generalmente declarase la dicha guerra contra los infieles, y diese a Nos, para Nos y nuestros sucesores reyes de Aragón, todo lo que con ayuda de Dios Nuestro Señor conquistásemos de las tierras de los infieles«.
The instructions addressed to Jerónimo de Vich can be seen as a further example of a juridical contention, which, presented in the erudite canon law terms of Innocent IV and Hostiensis, had, on the one hand, gained increased importance due to the Iberian expansion in Africa, Asia and America, and, on the other hand, became so relevant and popular that a man of action such as King Fernando -who probably never heard about the relevant authorities within this dispute -could easily synthesise the opposite opinions of Pope Innocent and Hostiensis and stand for the most favourable position for his own interests.
Taking into account both what appears to be a Salamancian tradition of unrestricted hostility towards the Pagans and its context of enunciation in the early 16 th century, which was very adverse toward infidels of any kind, the treatise De dominio Regum Hispaniae super Indos -often neglected by scholars lacking a proper diachronic perspective and a good knowledge of the way in which similar issues were discussed in the Late Middle Ages 68 -can be seen as a true milestone. Matías de Paz's willingness to confront the explicit royal ambition supporting the right of infidels to dominion did not come about simply due to the hostile context that I presented; instead, it had to do with the rephrasing of the debate for the first time using Aquinas' complex and nuanced theological vocabulary -whose Summa, rich in references to the relationship between Christians, infidels and converts as well as to the political central issue of dominium, De Paz was commenting on while at the University of Valladolid. De Paz opened up new perspectives in what was, up to this point, a deadlocked debate of diametrically opposed opinions.
As I will show, there were above all subtle internal divisions regarding the most problematic concepts under dispute -dominion and infidelity -which allowed De Paz to find a salvific path through the previously messy and inextricable forest.
In order to evaluate how De Paz overcame the old conceptual framework regarding dominion and infidelity, I will show that even if his treatise abounds with references to the classical perspectives of Innocent IV and Hostiensis, later revisited by other jurists and theologians -some of whom are also mention in the Libellus -he tends to express a clear dissatisfaction towards inherited schemas, considering them conceptually confusing. As we will see, for De Paz, the terms in which the rights of infidels to dominion have been evaluated were so inconsistent that he felt himself obliged to significantly redefine the most elementary concepts of the dispute: infidel, kinds of infidels, dominion, types of dominion, ignorance, etc.
Denouncing the limitations of the inherited conceptual framework Traditional legal and theological perspectives did not necessarily deny dominion for infidels. Even if, under the pressure of kings eager to expand to the southern Mediterranean, previous Salamancian masters had favoured the so-called Hostiensist opinion, many other 15 th -century learned men 69 had followed Innocent IV and made clear that infidelity, related to divine right, could not override dominion, related to human right and according to human reason. If the truth of this minor premise is accepted -and that was the case for every jurist and theologian, according to an extremely optimistic De Paz -then the major premise should also be accepted: that infidel lords and princes who convert to the Christian religion (which holds in general for all forms of conversion) retain their rights to dominium in the fullest 
70
Although minimising somehow the arguments and influence of Hostiensism, De Paz considered that these two points -i. e. that the infidels were true masters and possessors, and that they could not lose their offices and properties after converting to the Christian religion -had been made clear enough within what we could call the traditional paradigm. In his Libellum circa dominium super Indos, he appears to be unsatisfied with this classical perspective and complaints repeatedly about the inherited conceptual framework at different points in his treatise.
The first reason for De Paz's dissatisfaction was that the two very general conclusions mentioned above were clearly not sufficient in order to give an appropriate and detailed answer to the many dilemmas that were arising as a result of the surprisingly great discoveries in the Western Atlantic as well as the rapid process of disordered conquests that followed. While De Paz could partially rely on the tradition and find in the most important authorities of theology and canon law answers to the very first questions raised in his treatise -that is, whether the infidels had a true right of preemption (ius praelationis), and whether they kept this right after the coming of Christ (contrary to Hostiensis)
71 -the new kind of infidels who had been ›discovered‹ overseas could hardly be said to fit in a framework of concepts and norms constructed to support an unrestricted expansion of Christians over infidels in a context of mutually open hostility.
Unlike Muslims, Jews and ancient Pagan European peoples, the Pagans that, according to the reports of the missionaries, had been found within the confines of la Mar Océano happily welcomed the Christian missionaries, and those who had not been mistreated were ready to receive the Gospel.
72
Neither their friendly and hospitable attitudesomething that Vitoria also emphasised in his Relectiones -nor the tremendous distance existing between their provinces and the Christian republics seemed to justify a priori the application of the same kind of harsh actions against them used by Christian magistrates and soldiers in the Mediterranean sphere. Nevertheless, relying on the obsolete approaches that canon lawyers and theologians had developed since the 13 th century, the issue was by no means clear. Profiting from this kind of normative and regulatory impasse, the amphibological use of the older concepts of infidel, dominium, hostis, etc.
73 was tragically starting to spread and began to prevail in the legal reasoning and argumentation of conquerors asking for Indian slaves as mercedes for their deeds at the service of the crown.
Given the lack of correspondence between concepts and realities, the deliberately hostile infidels referred to in the inherited conceptual framework and the kind of friendly ignorant infidels that Among the many questions that remained open and unresolved after the first 20 years of Spanish presence in the Western Atlantic, and with regards to which former leading voices were powerless, the most important questions concerned the legality, permissibility and morality of what was de facto happening in America -namely, a succession of wars and plunders committed against infidels having lived in peace before the arrival of the Spaniards and not being hostes of the Christians.
75 As a theologian, De Paz should not only and primarily enlighten the King and his counsellors at the Junta de Burgos about the legality of the kind of actions and dominium until then exerted over the King's American vassals, but he also should state whether the kind of actions mentioned above were sinful, and whether, in this case, their perpetrators were obliged to restitute the goods and persons illegally seized. Even the king could be obliged to restitute all the incomes coming from the imposition of an illegal despotic and slavish domination over the Indians, a point that De Paz insinuates calling upon an unspecified pontifical decree.
76
The second important reason De Paz considered the approaches of his predecessors 77 to be unsatisfactory was that they were too general and radical in evaluating infidels' claims to dominion. Generally speaking, they provided categorical answers that either totally rejected infidels' dominion or provided excessive support to infidels' entitlements, especially with regards to jurisdiction (dominium iurisdictionis). Both extremes were for De Paz reprehensible: in the first case, learned men incited Christians to a never-ending war against every kind of infidel and to commit sinful deeds such as massacres and plunders. For its part, the second option -promoted by Innocent IV and some of his followers -created additional obstacles and barriers to the already difficult and onerous task of spreading the Gospel in remote areas and left their Christian vassals to the mercy of infidel lords.
In order to confront the existing confusion and ambiguity, not to mention to close the gap between these highly contested perspectives, De Paz tried to find a middle ground between Hostiensis and Innocent IV. More than this intermediate position, and De Paz's detailed answers to the many specific questions concerning the government and Christianisation of the Western Indies that had arisen after two decades of Spanish presence -whose full analysis would exceed the limits of a review article -what is of interest to us is the methodological strategy to which he resorted in order to suture the above-mentioned theoretical wound. The existing confrontation between Christian perspectives and the resulting ambiguity required, in his opinion, a complete redefinition of the main assumptions and premises in which the debate had been launched. Conceptual clarification appeared therefore as a necessary prior step before entering into the wild jungle of arguments and conclusions that had to be evaluated at the Junta de Burgos: »Et ita manent ambae quaestiones pro utraque sui parte ambiguae. Pro quarum quidem dilucidatione, tria per ordinem facere intendo; primo declarare aliquos terminos; secondo ponam aliquas conclusiones et earum corroborationes; tertio ad adducta respondendum erit quae contra illas videbantur.«
78
The first crucial conceptual distinction Matías de Paz made was between ignorant / innocent infidels and aware / guilty ones; a theological classification, already outlined in Aquinas' Summa theologiae (IIa-IIae, q. 10, a. 3), which had remained a kind of erudite and academic disquisition until it was filled with actual content and put into practice in the early modern American context. 
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Thomist approach to guilty and innocent infidels. Ignorance as a touchstone
The first concept to be thoroughly redefined in Libellus circa dominium super Indos is the concept of infidelity. Before the kind of dominium that the Spanish kings can legally exert over their ›newly discovered‹ subjects can be determined, De Paz states that the juridical and theological condition of these subjects has to be defined. As he explicitly claims, the task amounts to nothing less than the definition regarding the kind of people that the socalled Indians are, a central mission that the Dominican friar successfully achieved with the help of St. Thomas' teaching: »Tertio: declarandum est, quae gens sit supradicta indorum. Pro quo est notandum, quod sunt aliqui infideles ad quorum notitiam pervenit fides vera Redemptoris nostri, ut iudaei, sarraceni, turci, haeretici. Et isti habent peccatum proprie infidelitatis, non tantum privative sed et positive, et ita est maximum peccatum, ut sanctus Thomas probat in II.II, q. 10, a. 3. Alii vero sunt ad quorum notitiam forte nondum venit fides nostra, et si forsitan aliquando pervenit, nunc tamen non est in memoria illorum qui illam patriam inhabitant, talem fidem esse in orbe terrarum.«
83
As we can see, De Paz applies to the American natives the distinction between kinds of infidels that we can find in Aquinas' Summa; a distinction used by De Paz to declare the kind of people the Indians were, that is, to precisely define their theological status and avoid previous biased perspectives, in which their blameless infidelity was merged into a perverse totum revolutum with other types of inexcusable unbelief. Relying on what St.
Thomas stated in his IIa-IIae, q. 10, art. 3 and previously in art. 1 of this same question, De Paz focused on the clearly different theological status of Jews, Saracens, Turcs or Heretics (who had »the sin of infidelity positively«) and infidels such as the ones of the New World, who either never had contact with the Christian religion or, if they did during the Apostolic Age, they have completely forgotten it over the centuries. Following closely the Thomist conceptual framework and approach, De Paz considers this »privative« infidelity resulting from ignorance to be more a punishment than a sin. In any case, inasmuch as it could not be considered an informed, conscious and deliberate opposition against the faith, no theologian and jurist could blame the Indians for their infidelity.
Denying that this type of infidelity is a »pecca-tum actuale« at all, De Paz cancelled what was until the Junta de Burgos the theological alibi used by the crown to justify an unrestricted and brutal overseas expansion. The Dominican friar appears to be conscious of the strength of his conceptual finding and its utility to avoid precedents »errores«. Thus, he constantly reiterates and draws attention to this particular point throughout his treatise.
84
The key point in De Paz's reasoning is also inferred from another one of the sharp conceptual distinctions to be found in Summa theologiae, namely the differentiation between »vincible« and »invincible« ignorance in Ia-IIae, q. 76, arts. 2 and 3. As Marco Toste's contribution in this same issue of Rechtsgeschichte and some recent public lectures by Jacob Schmutz show, 85 the debates concerning the possibility of an ignorance of the primary and secondary precepts of natural law, and even of the existence of God, were already intensely debated long before Aquinas wrote his Summa. As we read in Toste's contribution, the topic had been addressed by earlier theologians such as Peter 86 Following Thomas, De Paz considers that while the ignorance of the Indians could not excuse them from a total theological ignorance and from the violation of the first principles of natural law -an inseparable content of human reason 87 -it had an exculpatory force with regards to some of the most elementary precepts that were called upon while waging war against the infidels: »Tamen talis ignorantia iuste potuit eos excusare quoad homines invadentes terram, ut iuste illam possent defendere, etsi invasores essent christiani, cum illi non defenderent se tamquam pugnantes contra Christum, aut cultores eius, ut faciunt turci et sarraceni, sed dumtaxat contra invasores patriae propriae, quam iustum est quem piam defendere donec scirent illos esse cultores veri Dei, atque proinde Redemptoris omnium […] . Et supradicta definitione de ignorantia vincibili circa fidem, quae non excusat, et invincibili contra bellatores quae excusat, pro hac materia est valde memoriae commendandum.«
88
The contemporary wars in the Western Atlantic were for De Paz totally new conflicts to which former regulations and customs could not be honestly applied. In his opinion, the isolation of America's natives was so absolute that even their occasional attempts to resist the entry of Christian soldiers and preachers could not properly be considered intentional and guilty, but rather a result of their ignorance and misunderstandings. Not knowing and not having had the opportunity to know that conquistadores and friars were, in fact, the servants of the True God and the agents of their soon redemption, they could not be blamed for regarding and resisting them as invaders, at least until they realised who the foreigners actually were. Henceforth, theological ignorance is not a topic that could be restricted to a purely religious sphere and concerning only the salvation of the Indians' souls, but is understood by De Paz as a part of a civilising gap with many political and juridical implications. Some of the most important are the ones concerning the regulation of war and the conditions under which a war against infidels could be considered a bellum iustum.
De Paz's work on the recently discovered realities of the American continent and, above all, the unexpected thousands of Pagan gentes seems to fill Aquinas' previously empty conceptual schemas regarding infidelity with content. Native Americans illustrate much better than the remote possibility of the homo silvestris mentioned in De Veritate or the cases of the crazy and mentally handicapped men envisioned by Aquinas (in Summa theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 76, art. 3 89 ) this category of innocent infidels not equatable with Jews and Muslims. In turn, Aquinas' theoretical mastership sheds light on what were, until then, blind and dispersed intuitions 90 by some theologians and jurists, thus allowing Spaniards and Europeans to perceive the Indians in a new and clear light and as they theologically and legally really were, instead of perversely confusing then with other kinds of infidels.
The new theoretical developments coming from the field of theology did not imply that De 
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Paz neglected or rejected the juridical science and its concepts and criteria. In fact, among the authorities quoted by De Paz to clarify the infidels' right to dominion, we find also Innocent IV. If Aquinas is the main theological reference for De Paz with regards to infidelity, Innocent IV is the canon lawyer who acts as a reliable guide in most of the juridical precisions introduced by De Paz in his attempt to clearly profile the legal status of the Indians. De Paz agrees completely with Pope Innocent's opinions stating that infidels could only be fought, deprived of dominion and expelled from the lands they inhabited if they were usurpers of the Holy Land or other territories that were once under the jurisdiction of the Roman Empire, or if they mistreated and oppressed Christians. Such an intense theological and juridical focus on the concept of infidelity and its types represents a great innovation in the Hispanic realm, especially if we compare the rich and detailed analysis of De Paz with the poor and careless approaches to infidelity found in the treatises written by previous Salamancian masters such as Alonso de Cartagena 91 and Bernardino López de Carvajal.
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Both of them seem to have intentionally avoided this kind of precision in order to easily dismiss any possible native claim to dominium in the case of the Canarian and other African Pagans, whose theological status was, in fact, very similar to that of the Indians.
Reappraisal of Aquinas' doctrines on infidels' dominion and the distinction between dominium possessorium and dominium praelationis (iurisdictionis)
Just as important as the distinctions between different kinds of infidels and types of ignorance, we also find in Libellus circa dominium super Indos the key references to the difference between the dominium that individuals (private persons) exert over their goods and own bodies, referred to by De Paz as dominium possessorium, and the dominium exerted by kings and other public authorities (public persons) over vassals or citizens. While other theologians and jurists used to refer to this second kind of dominium as dominium iurisdictionis, De Paz prefers to speak of a dominium praelationis, that is, the right of preemption.
The term dominium praelationis is found in Aquinas' Summa (IIa-IIae, q. X, a. 10, »Utrum infideles possint habere praelationem seu dominium supra fideles«
93
) and in other theological manuals written in the mid-13 th century. 94 Even if this last term did not crystalise into one of the capital notions that would appear and be discussed in later treatises and lectures on asuntos de Indias, it is nevertheless a notion that fits well with the kind of political structures that the Spaniards had found up till then in the Western Atlantic, that is, a clear hierarchisation of societies -for instance, the preeminence of certain men, women or families -but whose proper exercise of jurisdiction was not clear or appeared to be very different from the European one.
Never having been in the overseas dominion and forced to rely on contradictory reports of conflicting parties, it is a problematic topic that Matías de Paz cleverly avoids. Thus, we do not find in Libellus circa dominium super Indos the kind of pseudo-ethnological approach that is very common in other juridical and theological writings of this period. While in Vitoria's or Palacios Rubios' treatises the political, economic and juridical institutions of the ›discovered‹ peoples used to be equated with apparently similar European institutions and are also considered as civilisational achievements granting the natives future political rights under the Spanish kings, De Paz does not consider it a relevant issue. In his attempt to determine the juridical status of the natives, the only important factor seems to be the natives' positive attitude toward receiving the Gospel. De Paz's preference for the term dominium praelationis reflects both this uncommitted and inattentive view of the indigenous policía as well as his preference for theological argumentation in his attempt at profiling the status according to which the Indians will be ruled. As had been the case for the differentiation between types of infidels, the appearance of the distinction between dominium possesorium and dominium praelationis takes place in the Libellus after an exhaustive review of previous juridical and theological opinions concerning infidels' dominion. After determining that the multiple canons of the Corpus Iuris Canonici that could be considered pertinent to this issue were clearly contradictory, De Paz proceeds to verify that canon lawyers had not been able to give a clear and unified answer to the many dilemmas arising from the relations between Christian and infidels. Instead of adopting a common position with regards to the infidels, canon lawyers had either remained powerless before the selva intextricabilis of the pontifical decrees or fought each other. The most paradigmatic example of this disagreement was to be found in the problematic master-disciple relationship existing between Innocent IV and Hostiensis, whose opposing opinions are explained by De Paz at length.
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Somehow forced to give his first impressions about the arguments of Innocent IV and Hostiensis, De Paz concludes the opinion of Pope Innocent to be truer than that of Hostiensis, whose multiple contradictions are manifest.
96 It is important to note that, in this initial step, De Paz supports Innocent's position because Hostiensis' contrary position seems to him »absurdum« and because some of the most respected canon lawyers of the 14 th and 15 th centuries (Petrus Ancaranus, Antoninus Florentinus, Nicolaus de Tudeschis) have given him reason to doubt it. The rational arguments in favour of infidels' dominion, which will later appear in Vitoria's Relectio de Indis, are also taken into account by De Paz. 97 Bringing together the most sound reasons and authorities, Innocent IV's opinion on the matter is preliminary accepted »salvo meliori iudicio«. This better judgment appears shortly thereafter in his treatise. It consists, again, in a salvific appeal to the theological authority of Aquinas; that combined with the conceptual distinction between private and public dominion will allow the kings' counsellors to get rid of the belligerent and absurd Hostiensis once and for all, yet without constraining, on the other hand, the Spanish expansion in the Indies to the rigorous framework built by Innocent IV to protect pacific infidels as non usurpers of former Christian lands.
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After the somewhat disappointing review of canonical authorities, De Paz examines the opinions of theologians and observes that, even if they rarely share such a total denial of infidels' dominion as the one found in Hostiensis' writings, they do not agree on the conditions under which they can exert dominium, a sign of the difficulty of the matter in dispute according to De Paz. 99 While Peter Lombard, in one of the distinctions of his IV Books of the Sentences (Summa sententiarum, II, d. 44) ) considered this kind of subordination undesirable and troublesome. According to Aquinas -whose criteria in this matter was followed by De Paz -being derived from natural reason, dominium was independent of grace and could not be abrogated. The Church could, nevertheless, take actions in order to prevent infidels from an exercise of dominium contravening Christian faith. That implied the liberation of Christian vassals under the authority of an infidel king or magistrate whenever the pope considered it convenient, and even the preventive dethroning of any prince representing a present or future threat to the spreading of the Gospel. The power of decision concerning why, when, were and against whom to intervene felt under the exclusive competence of the Church: »Ex hoc mihi videtur verum quod. S. Thomas asserit immo quod plus est teneo (salvo tamem meliori iudicio et absque temeraria assertione) hanc conclusionem: quod Ecclesia iuste potest spoliari omnes principes propter solam infidelitatem dominio suo dato, quod subditi non convertantur ad fidem. Quam etiam visus est tenere Hostiense, sed non ita generaliter.«
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As we can see, the authority of Aquinas is clearly the element that allows De Paz to transcend the chasm that had split canon lawyers for centuries. Resorting to Aquinas' opinion on infidels' dominion, De Paz strikes an acceptable balance between two previously irreconcilable fronts. Henceforth, Salamancian masters will interpret in different ways IIa-IIae, q. 10, a. 10 and will still disagree on different issues related to infidels' dominion. In any case, the step made by De Paz clearly opened the door for an important reorientation of the debates that, in the future, will no longer be blocked by the Innocent IV -Hostiensis dispute and will be increasingly oriented toward theology.
The difference between the public and private dimensions of dominium, emphasised by De Paz in the last part of his argumentation, is the icing on the cake in this innovative approach to infidels' possessions and reigns. With this new distinction, De Paz affirms his intention to remediate many confusions derived from the two general approaches to dominium found in the writings of many jurists: »Et ad id quod iuristae dicunt, quod opportet in hoc imitare Deum, »qui solem suum facit oriri super bonos et malos, dando eis bona temporalia et ita dat eis dominia, notanda est hic valde quaedam definitione, cuius ignorantia multos fefellit. Dicit, enim, est duplex dominium: scilicet, possesorium et praelationis. Concedo quod habent infideles vere dominium possesorium, id est bonorum temporalium suorum, et quod propter solam infidelitatem non possunt illo ab Ecclesia privari […] . Aliud verum est dominium, quod est propie praelationis, super multitudinem populi, quod vocatur regimen, et tali merito suae infidelitates possunt privari, ut S. Thomas dicit, immo dico, ut dixi, quod illud non habent nisi quantum Ecclesia permittit, itaque ab Ecclesia iuste possunt spoliari.«
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Even if jurists were any easy target for De Paz, making them appear as ignorant, incompetent and, ultimately, responsible for the chaos in the government of the Indies, the fact is that with this conceptual precision, the Dominican friar is correcting the ambiguity and imprecision with which dominium used to be addressed in the writings of the theologians. For the jurists in the service of the Hispanic overseas expansion, the dual dimension of dominium was clear enough since, at least, the Late Middle Ages. For example, referring to the Canary Islands, Alonso de Cartagena had already distinguished between a »dominium in rebus suis« and a »dominium quantum ad iurisdictionem« or »superioritatem«.
103 Dealing with similar issues, neither López de Carvajal nor previous Spanish theologians have demonstrated such a level of precision. Looking back in time, the problem could even be appreciated in Aquinas' reasoning about infidels' dominium. In IIa-IIae, q. 10, a. 10, the doctor of the Church confusedly equated dominium with praelationis. Aquinas did not specifically address possession of temporal goods but, while justifying with a brief remark the releasing of Christian slaves possessed by Jews, he seemed to leave the door open for an unrestricted freedom of action by the Church with regards to any kind of infidels' goods.
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Making a clear distinction between the two dimensions of dominium, the disciple (De Paz) surpasses the master (Aquinas) and considers the topic in greater depth. The theoretical development is important for the history of Thomism and the School of Salamanca inasmuch as it allows us to see that, from the early reception of Aquinas' thought at the University of Salamanca and its first application to the American controversies, the Salamancian masters not only uncritically reproduced Aquinas' concepts and approaches but also corrected and adapted them to the new emerging realities that were unknown to Aquinas.
This last distinction is also factually relevant. We can see it as a strategy adopted by De Paz to protect the natives from enslavement, tyrannical servitude and the theft of their relatives and belongings, without giving the impression that heand by extension his ›disruptive‹ fellow Dominicans, led by Montesinos and Las Casas -were trying to deny, reduce or even limit the political authority of the Spanish kings over their newly acquired dominions. In a sense sacrificing the caciques -perceived as a potential threat to the complex process of indoctrination of their vassalsDe Paz tried to curb instances of theft and enslavement 105 as well as to oppose the complete annihilation of the indigenous dominium that Hostiensis and, following him, most of De Paz's contemporaries straightforwardly supported.
Regulating Spanish rule with normative concepts: principatus despoticus and principatus regalis
The last conceptual distinction that I would like to mention before proceeding to the conclusions of this article is, in fact, the first in order of appearance in De Paz's Libellus. The distinction between principatus despoticus and principatus regalis is an old and well-studied distinction within political philosophy. It dates back at least to Aristotle's Politics, a crucial influence, in turn, on Aquinas' political thought, who revisited almost every Aristotelian idea. Its influence was also particularly strong in the case of one of the most prominent disciples of Aquinas, Ptolomey of Lucca, who Just as in the case of his definitions of infidelitas and dominium, conceptual clarity is the decisive factor allowing the Dominican friar to provide a set of red lines that the conquerors and the royal authorities should not transgress if they do not want to be considered robbers, murders or tyrants and suffer eternal damnation.
111 Even if for the history of concepts this last distinction between principatus despoticus and principatus regalis is not as innovative as the one previously mentioned, it is nevertheless the distinction that frames the content and the tone of De Paz's discourse from the very beginning. In fact, the very first lines of the Libellum tell us that the Dominican friar reformulated and synthesised the questions that Fernando el Católico and his counsellors had addressed to the jurists and theologians present at the Junta in the Aristotelian-Thomist conceptual framework: quod fides non augmentatur, sed potius diminuitur propter talem servitutem, et si dimitterentur liberi magis ac magis augeretur.«
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As a final remark, it is important to emphasise the multinormative 114 character of De Paz's approach to the acute dilemmas and the issues that were at stake in the Western Indies. As we have seen throughout this article, written laws and legal prescriptions are very important for De Paz. In paragraphs such as the one just quoted, he assumes and cannot say more than, according to contemporary regulations concerning ius belli, that many natives could have been legally made slaves, either because they abruptly attacked the unfamiliar friars and soldiers or because they resisted the Spaniards after having promised obedience. Nevertheless, the cultural distance and lack of knowledge of the ›recently discovered‹ Pagans, derived from his millenary isolation, was for De Paz so great, that he suggests putting on hold or, at least, to reduce the rigor of these and other legal prescriptions in order to give preference to the religious precept of charity and to the religious imperative of increase in faith.
Conclusions
Contemporary scholars presented a uniform view as to the relationship between infidelity and the right to dominion espoused by the theologians and jurists who studied and taught at the University of Salamanca in the Early Modern Period. Within most studies, 115 the crucial figure seems to be that of Francisco de Vitoria, often considered the theologian who pioneered the identification of the historical dilemmas arising from the ›discovery‹ of new non-Christian peoples on Atlantic islands.
116 Nevertheless, the complexity of the ideas underlying this rich debate can be understood only if studied as part of a broader perspective. Unfortunately, there is an almost complete lack of literature about the real connections existing between the thought of Vitoria and previous Salamanca Dominican masters such as Matías de Paz.
As I have shown in this article, even if the historiography about the School of Salamanca is used to portray Vitoria as a pioneer in the introduction of Thomism at Salamanca and in the Thomist approach to the asuntos de Indias, De Paz should be considered a precursor in all these respects. Being a converso, like Vitoria, in a period in which linaje was alarmingly gaining significance, De Paz wrote De dominio Regum Hispaniae super Indos as a man deeply concerned about the many legal and theological issues concerning infidelity, conversion and Christianization that at this crucial period were at stake both inside and outside the Iberian domains of the Hispanic monarchy. As was the case for Vitoria, the main object of concern for these men living under the shadow of an indelible infidelity but, at the same time, with accesssomewhat paradoxically -to the higher instances of administration and government in the kings' counsels, was the juridical statute that the monarchy would accord to its converso subjects, namely were they descendants from Jews, Muslims or Pagans. Matías de Paz initiated a fight thatbrilliantly prosecuted some decades later by Francisco de Vitoria -was in fact, a defense of a millenary theological and juridical tradition, the benevolent treatment and even warm welcome that the missionary Christian Church has given to converts since its foundation.
More than the specific answers that De Paz offered to the questions that were put to him at the Junta de Burgos (1512), much more refined in Vitoria's later approach, it is De Paz's innovative conceptual reframing and refocusing of the discussion of the dominium exerted by and over infidels -a true conceptual revolution in the history of ideas -which allow us to consider him as the clear initiator of the Thomist approach to the debate on the iusti tituli. It is a topic of tremendous interest for the internal history of the School of Salamanca, especially given that the just titles polemic, at the core of the general debates on the Spanish domination over the New World, is one of the most genuinely Salamancian focuses of interest; 117 a topic about which hundreds of thousands -or maybe millions -of pages have been written, but very often in such a repetitive and non-critical way that we are still lacking a clear genealogy of the way in which this and other topics of concern and controversy appeared and were progressively addressed.
The importance given to concepts and conceptual clarification is what above all distinguished De Paz's learned advice from previous approaches to infidels' dominion and to contemporary treatises on the affairs of the Indies. For example, while Palacios Rubios, who was also asked to write down his opinion after the Junta de Burgos, circles around the traditional conceptual framework and is consequently driven to close his treatise with an ambiguous conclusion reflecting his own persistent doubts on the matter he was called to clarifysomething that Christiane Birr's contribution in this same issue of Rechtsgeschichte sharply brings into view -Matías de Paz first offers precise definitions of the most elementary terms that will be used in his reasoning. Once this first step is complete, he is then able to proceed rapidly and surely in his argumentation and to arrive at several brief and sharp conclusions.
In other words, even if Palacios Rubios demonstrates a considerable knowledge of the Summa theologiae and other writings by Aquinas -even using key excerpts from IIa-IIae, allowing him to classify the native Americans as infidels who had never heard of Christ and the Gospel 118 -he does not develop Aquinas' categorisation to its full potential. Giving Aquinas the same value as the more than 130 authorities quoted in his Libellus de Insulis Oceanis, Palacios Rubios seems to become paralysed by the heavy burden of the tradition (sources, authors, codes, etc.) he tries to synthesise, and he ends up not moving an inch from the classical framework previously built up by those civil and canon lawyers and papalist theologians (Andrea, Augustinus Triumphus, Bartolus, Baysio, Antoninus of Florence, Giovanni d'Ancona, Hostiensis, Innocent IV, etc.) later strongly criticised by Vitoria in his theological writings. Trapped inside the ambiguities of the sources he uses, Palacios Rubios clearly ended up repeating Giovanni d'Ancona's flagrant contradictions concerning infidels' dominium 119 and therefore left the door open to the continuity of the status quo in the Indies.
Without engaging in the same kind of bitter criticism Vitoria did, De Paz demonstrates enough independence of thought to keep a salutary distance from the sources he is reviewing.
Contrary to Palacios Rubios, De Paz's conceptual precision and much more balanced criteria of selection and use of authorities allow him to draw sacrosanct red lines, not hesitating -as Las Casas and later denouncers of the abuses committed against the natives will do -to threaten his fellow countrymen with perpetual torments and God's anger. Nevertheless, De Paz also grants an undeniable legitimacy to the dominium of the Spanish kings over the newly discovered lands, 120 apparently put into question by the Dominicans supporting Antonio de Montesinos. Inasmuch as this dominium was already being exercised de facto by the Spanish king and royal officers, and that the Spanish presence and domination appeared to be as an irreversible fact and that a hypothetical abandonment of the recently subjugated territories would cause a tremendous harm to the Christian religion, leaving native neophytes in the lurch -all of them, elements that Vitoria took also into account in the last sentences of his proposal in order to redirect and regulate the way in which the Spaniards ruled the natives.
122 As I argued in this article, conceptual innovations and the new nuances introduced with regards to traditional terms were the tools with which Matías de Paz tried to apprehend and regulate a changing and dramatic reality. Here we are dealing with a kind of intellectual attitude and strategy that, already present in Aquinas' attitude towards facts, would distinguish the juridical and political thought coming from Salamanca in the centuries to come. 122 Similar considerations were made by Anthony Pagden in his characterisation of Vitoria's writings, which were considered more an attempt to legitimise, regulate and improve a de facto domination than a proper »fight for justice«. Pagden undertook a critical revision of the anachronistic and legitimist accounts made by Hanke, Carro, Losada, Marcos and many other previous scholars. The most elaborated version of this historiographical criticism is found in the introductory remarks to the Spanish edition of The fall of natural man. »He sostenido en este libro que los crueles argumentos que siguieron a la conquista no pueden ser comprendidos como (por utilizar el término de Hanke) ›una lucha por la justicia‹ -aunque claramente se refiere a la iustitia en sentido amplio -, sino que sólo pueden entenderse como una búsqueda de legitimación (en el sentido weberiano del término). Es decir, se trataba de discusiones sobre cómo explicar y al explicarlo hacerlo inteligible, un hecho real que, como Vitoria señaló, era ya irreversible desde la década de 1530«. Pagden (1988) 18.
